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ABSTRACT
The spoor law is a rule of African customary law that determines liability
for stock theft. It provides that, if the tracks of lost or stolen livestock can
be traced to a homestead or its immediate surrounds, the head of that
establishment will be held liable. If the direction of the spoor do not point
to a specific homestead, all those in the vicinity become jointly liable. As a
convenient deterrent to the theft of livestock, the spoor law was incorporated
into the laws of the Cape Province, Natal and the Transkeian Territories at
the end of the nineteenth century, making it the only rule of customary law
to be applicable without regard to race prior to the new Constitution. This
article questions whether the spoor law still is, and should be, part of South
African law. It has never been formally repealed, and still survives in the
1983 Transkei Penal Code. Although the law has not been mentioned in a
reported case for many years, it might play a valuable role in crime control,
since stock theft remains a serious and pervasive crime in South Africa.
The article argues, however, that it will probably not survive constitutional
review, because it has the effect of imposing a reverse onus of proof.
1. Introduction
The spoor law is a rule of African customary law, which, in the past
at least, was regularly applied in various parts of Southern Africa,
notably the Transkei,' Natal and Zululand.2 In broad terms, the
law was a method for determining the liability arising from theft of
livestock. While generally associated with cattle - always the prize
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In 1878, for instance, there is evidence of the practice of spoor law in the Idutywa
District: Cape Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs 1883 (1) at 94,
362 and 466. This work is cited in a useful book by DS Koyana The Influence of the
Transkei Penal Code on South African Criminal Law (1992) 57.
2 EJ Krige Social System of the Zulu (1962) 229. See, too, section 6 of the Cattle
Stealing Law 10 of 1876 (Natal).
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target of stock thieves3 - the spoor law could be invoked for theft of
other types of stock or, according to two cases, even ordinary items
of property.4
The spoor law provided that, if the tracks5 of missing livestock
could be traced to a homestead or its immediate surrounds - a figure
of 500 or 600 yards is often given - the head of that establishment
would be held liable.6 To avoid liability he had to give a satisfactory
explanation for the stock or assist in furthering the search. When he
could show that the tracks continued past his establishment, his duty
was obviously discharged, but, if he refused to further the search, he
would be considered guilty of theft and ordered to make recompense.7
If the direction of the spoor did not point to a specific homestead, all
those in the immediate vicinity became jointly liable.8
The 'spoor' did not necessarily have to be the imprint of hooves.
Other evidence of the presence of stock in the area sufficed.9 For
instance, a rule (that may have been peculiar to Xhosa-speakers)
provided that if, during a house-to-house search, meat was found
concealed on the premises, the head of that establishment would be
required to prove that it was not from the missing beast. In other
words, he had to explain the spoor (ukugqitbisa umkbondo), failing
which, he would be held liable for the value of the beast.10
3 Because of their social, economic and religious significance in the cultures of
Southern Africa, see Krige op cit (n2) 185-187; MH Wilson Reaction to Conquest 2ed
(1964) 68-70; HO Monning The Pedi (1967) 163ff; H Kuper An African Aristocracy
(1961) 36 and 150-152; EJ Krige & JD Krige The Realm of a Rain Queen: A study of
the pattern of Lovedu society (1943) 44.
4 Nkhuade v Mafunda 3 NAC 266 (1913) and Matyeni v Smayile (1936) NAC (C & 0)
30. The Cape Government Commission op cit (ni) at 26, however, suggested that the
rule should be limited to only stock theft. AJ Kerr The Customary Law oflmmovable
Property and Succession 3ed (1990) 82 says that the term 'spoor law' came about
because most cases of theft in the nineteenth century concerned livestock.
The Queen v M'Balo (1891-1892) 9 SC 379 at 381, however, held that the finding of
a carcass of a dead animal was analogous to finding its spoor. See also Tyaliti and
Others v Sindiwe 1 NAC 158 (1907).
6 Koyana op cit (ni) 58-59; GMB Whitfield South African Native Law 2ed (1948) 258,
481 and 483; Kerr op cit (n4) 82-83. See also M'Balo's case supra (n5) at 379-380;
Tyaliti and Others v Sindiwe 1 NAC 158 (1907); Bakqana v Kesler 1933 EDL 50 at
52-53 and Matyeni v Smayile 1936 NAC (C & 0) 30.
7 Even though the identity of the actual thief was not determined: Koyana op cit (nl)
at 58 (footnotes omitted).
See Bakqana supra (n6) at 55, where liability was joint, not joint and several. See
further, Whitfield op cit (n6) 483 and Bakqana supra (n6) at 59-60.
9 See Kerr op cit (n4) 82 and Whitfield op cit (n6) 483.
10 'The effect of this is to make every Native living in his tribal state a detective, and
thus an inexpensive substitute for a police force will be continued throughout the
Territories': Cape Government Commission op cit (nl) 26.
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European settlers readily adapted the spoor law to their own use.
On the one hand, its implicit presumption of guilt circumvented the
need to search for more direct evidence, thus providing a convenient
method for recovering stock without having to comply with all the
rules of colonial justice." On the other hand, because neighbours who
refused to assist in the search for lost stock became jointly liable for
the offence, the spoor law was thought to have an excellent deterrent
effect on anyone contemplating stock theft, which was a persistent
problem in the farming communities of colonial Africa. 12
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the law, however, was the right
it gave to self-help. In this regard, of course, the law was typical of all
pre-state societies, where the duty of law enforcement lay in the hands
of the victim and, when possible, spread to the wider community. In
early English law, for example,
'When a crime has been discovered the natural thing to do is to call for help
and pursue the trail of the criminal. This is regularized as "hue and cry" and
neglect to raise it is a serious matter .... The neighbours ought to turn out
with their weapons ... and go from vill to vill [village]. The criminal who is
caught as the result of hot pursuit will be dealt with summarily .... '13
Self-help was also permitted in. the law of the early Roman Republic.
The XII Tables' 4 provided that a person suspected of having committed
the delict of furtum would be obliged to submit to a house search,
either formal or informal (the former being lance et licio).15 If the thief
was caught in the act (furtum manifestum), the penalties were more
31 See, for example, Matyeni v Smayile 1936 NAC (C & 0) 30; Whitfield op cit (n6)
482 and the Cape Government Commission op cit (nl) 25. Hence, the spoor law
appeared in Cape Ordinance 2 of 1837, the Cattle Theft Repression Act 16 of 1864,
the Stock Theft Act 35 of 1883 (Cape), the Cattle Removal Act, 14 of 1870 and the
Cattle Removal Amendment Act 20 of 1889 (Cape); the Cattle Stealing Law 10 of
1876 (Natal) and articles 11 and 12 of the Conventie van Aliwal (1869) (Orange Free
State).
12 Such was the evidence by the Cape Government Commission op cit (nl) 26; Whitfield
op cit (n6) 482; Chief Commisioner Warner Mr Warner's notes (1856) in Colonel
Maclean Laws and Customs (1858) (new impression 1968) 68.
13 TFT Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law 5ed (1956) 430 and Sir William
Holdsworth A History ofEnglish Law 4ed (1936) (2) 101.
14 Table II Law IVff.
15 Whereby the complainant had to search wearing only a loin cloth and bearing a
platter. See HF Jolowicz Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1954)
170-172. Table II Law VI: 'When any persons commit a theft during the day and
in the light ... and attempt to defend themselves with weapons ... and the party
against whom the violence is committed raises the cry of thief, and calls upon other
persons, if any are present, to come to his assistance; and this is done, and the
thieves are killed by him in the defence of his person and property, it is legal, and
no liability attaches to the homicide.'
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severe, but in order to establish this situation the victim was obliged
to raise an outcry.16
In general, a high degree of civic responsibility was expected
in societies without a police force.17 Hence, in pre-colonial Africa,
when people were encountered passing through a district with cattle,
they were to be questioned about their origins, otherwise the local
inhabitants would be held responsible for losses. This rule had the
effect of making,
'[e]very man ... his brother's keeper in the eyes of the law, and consequently
in the interests of the community each individual acquaints himself with
what is afoot in the neighbourhood. It is this great principle of collective
responsibility upon which the spoor law is founded.,1
8
The self-help nature of the spoor law is evident not only in this
emphasis on civic responsibility but also on the implicit right -of hot
pursuit19 and the custom of raising a 'hue and cry', which was at one
and the same time an alarm call and a call to all neighbours to join
the hunt.
These antecedents in Roman and English common law suggest that,
by recognising the spoor law, colonial authorities in South Africa
were endorsing customs that were close to their own legal traditions.
Application of the spoor law, however, encouraged a commando form
of self-help, 20 which was a contentious issue in colonial history.21
16 T Wood A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law (1730) 3.7.1.
17 Although, as Holdsworth op cit (n13) 99 and 102 points out, the aim of early law
was to persuade people to submit to the court and to restrict the circumstances
in which they could resort to self-help. Hence, if a victim wanted to ensure that
his actions would be condoned, he had to observe various formalities, such as the
search lance et licio (house search) in Roman law or raising the hue and cry in
English law.
is Sir Jacob Barry, giving evidence for the 1883 the Cape Commission op cit (nl) 386.
See South African Association for the Advancement of Science Report of the Annual
Meeting of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science (1919) (16)
134.
19 Whereby the victims of theft could pursue offenders outside their immediate
jurisdictions into neighbouring areas. As early as 1817, Lord Charles Somerset
promulgated regulations permitting settler farmers to cross the border into Xhosa
lands in order retrieve supposedly stolen cattle from the nearest African homesteads:
As reported by TRH Davenport & C Saunders South Africa, A Modern History 5ed
(2000) 134.
20 Spoor Law was also known as the 'reprisal system': Noel Mostert Frontiers: the epic
of South Africa's creation and the tragedy of the Xhosa people (1992) 450.
21 As in the Orange Free State and Eastern Cape. See H Giliomee The Afrikaner: a
biography (2003) 131; Mostert op cit (n20) 449ff; H Gilliomee & B Mbenga The New
History of South Africa (2007) 102 and Davenport & Saunders op cit (n19) 134. See
also the evidence of Rev Bryce Ross who said that great injustices were perpetrated
by spoor law: Cape Government Commission op cit (nl) Appendix B, 221.
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Indeed, abuse of the spoor law led to accusations that settlers were
enlarging their herds at the expense of local tribes.22
With hindsight, the decision by the colonial authorities to incorporate
the spoor law into the colonial legal system seems remarkable. In the
first place, this is probably the only rule of customary law to have
been made part of the general law of the land:2 3 in 1886, it became
part of a Penal Code for the Transkeian Territories,24 and, in 1899 part
of statutes on stock theft for the Cape2 5 and for Natal.26 In the second
place, with the exception of Natal, the spoor law was applied without
regard to race.
Given the flexible and variable nature of customary law, the details
of spoor law would have varied from area-to-area and from time-to-
time. But, when included in colonial legislation, these differences were
disregarded in favour of a standard formula purporting to represent
the customs of the area. Sections 200 to 202 of the 1886 Transkei Penal
Code are a good example, and, in the absence of better contemporary
evidence to the contrary, these provisions will be taken as a fair
reflection of the customs of the Transkeian Territories.
Under the heading Responsibility for Value of Stolen Property under
Spoor law, the Penal Code provided that:
Section 200
'(1) ... when the spoor of any stolen animals is traced to any kraal or locality
responsibility in respect of such stolen animals shall be determined as
hereinafter provided; that is to say: -
(1) The head of any kraal (umninimzi) shall be -responsible for the value
and damages of any stolen animals, the spoor of which is traced to such
a kraal.
(2) The owner of any stolen animals, the spoor of which has become lost
or obliterated, has a right of search for any.traces of such animal, in
any hut, kraal, enclosure or lands in that neighbourhood; any person
refusing to permit such a search is responsible for the value of the
animal stolen.
(3) When the owner of any animal is on the spoor of such animal, it shall
be lawful for the owner to demand from the persons living in the
neighbourhood all reasonable assistance in following up such spoor, and
whoever neglects or refuses to give such assistance, and by such neglect
22 A Lester Imperial Networks: creating identities in nineteenth-century South Africa
(2001) 42.
23 Mostert op cit (n20) 449-450 and Gilliomee & Mbenga op cit (n21) 102. The deterrent
effect of spoor law outweighed its various demerits: Whitfield op cit (n6) 482 and
the Cape Government's Commission op cit (nl) 286.
24 Transkeian Territories Penal Code 24 of 1886 (Cape). For the spoor law provisions,
see below.
25 Cattle Stealing Act 1 of 1889 (Cape).
26 Act 1 of 1899 (Natal).
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or refusal causes the loss or obliteration of such spoor, or whoever
by willful obstruction or malice causes the obliteration or loss of such
spoor, is liable for the value of the animal stolen.
(4) When such spoor cannot be traced to any specific kraal or kraals, but is
lost or becomes obliterated on any lands, then the responsibility for the
value of such stolen animal shall devolve upon the heads (abaninimizi)
of the kraals adjacent to and surrounding the spot where such spoor has
been lost or obliterated: and for the purpose of compensating the owner
of such stolen animal, it shall be lawful for the Resident Magistrate so
to fix such responsibility by an assessment not exceeding two head of
cattle (or their money value), to be by such Magistrate levied on each
kraal, to make up the whole value, or as near as possible the whole
value, of the stolen animal or animals.
(5) Whenever a spoor is traced to, or within, the confines of any locality
occupied by any kraal or kraals, or to or within any area occupied by
any community or section of a tribe, if the persons occupying such kraal
or kraals, or locality, or constituting such community or such section of a
tribe, without lawful excuse, neglect or refuse to receive to take over and
follow up such spoor, they are responsible for the value of the stolen
animal whose spoor shall have been so traced, and are to be compelled
to make good such value to the owner in like manner as is provided for
with reference to "lost spoor" cases in the preceding sub-section.'
Section 201
'Whoever fraudulently and with intent to injure another shall create any
spoor, shall be punished with a fine not exceeding fifty pounds sterling, and
in default of payment'with imprisonment with or without hard labour for a
term which may extend to twelve months.'
Section 202
'It shall be lawful for the resident magistrate of any district, whenever any
claim is made against any person or persons in respect of the spoor traced
to any kraal of locality, upon request of the owner of the animal or animals
stolen, or of any person authorized by such owner to inquire summarily and
without pleading, but in the presence of the heads of the kraals upon whom
responsibility is sought to be attached, into the circumstances of the case,
and the value of the animal or animals alleged to have been stolen, together
with the damage which the owner or owners shall have sustained by the loss
or by the cost of search of other endeavour to recover the same, and may
give judgment in favour of such owner as hereinbefore provided.'
As is apparent in the Code, the spoor 'law' was in fact a composite
set of rules, although it is usually referred to as if it were only one.
These rules regulated the rights and powers of the stock owner, as
well as the duties and liabilities of the homesteads to which the stock
had been traced. Section 200(1) subsection (1) of the Code provided
for individual liability to pay compensation where the spoor could be
traced to a homestead. Subsections 1(2) and (3) gave the stock owner a
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right of hot pursuit,27 and subsection 1(3) obliged neighbours to assist
the pursuers in terms that suggested compensation (although it might
also have been construed as a penalty justified by the public nature of
the duty of pursuit). Subsection 1(5) obliged the head of the homestead
in question to take up the pursuit. Here, the sanction for failure to
comply was compensation. Where the spoor could not be traced to a
specific homestead or was lost, subsection 1(4) established liability to
pay compensation, which, depending on the facts of particular cases,
could amount to collective liability. Section 201 created a criminal
offence by penalising the laying of false spoor,28 and section 202
established a process to be followed in cases of stolen stock, a process
that was civil rather than criminal in nature.
It is many years since the spoor law attracted the interest of legal
practitioners or academics, which is doubtless due, in part at least,
to the fact that stock farming is no longer a mainstay of the South
African economy. Nonetheless, theft of livestock continues to plague
farmers.29 For that reason only - if not the intriguing theoretical issues
raised by spoor law - this article reconsiders the rule and its statutory
variants. Does the spoor law still exist, and, if so, does it withstand
constitutional scrutiny?
2. Continued existence of the spoor law
The continued existence of the spoor law depends on the form in
which it appears. The law may appear as a series of provisions in
a statute (such as the Transkei Penal Code), as a product of the so-
called 'official' customary law (i.e. in cases, restatements and academic
writings) or as 'living' law (i.e. the rules actually being observed by
communities in the present day).3 0
a) Survival of the statutory rule
As mentioned above, the spoor law was included in colonial legislation
for the Cape, Natal and the Transkeian Territories. In 1959, a Stock
Theft Act 3 1 provided uniform national rules for South Africa, thereby
27 Note that there is no equivalent provision in the Transkei Penal Code Act 9 of 1983
(Transkei).
28 See also Zwaartbooi v Gunjwe and Otbers 3 NAC 267 (1912).
29 Thamsanqa Magubane 'Stock theft spirals out of control' in The Witness on 6 June
2011 at 5.
30 For the distinction between 'official' and 'living' customary law see: AJGM Sanders
'How customary is African customary law?' (1987) 20 CILSA 405.
31 The new rules were laid down in sections 1 to 5 of the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959.
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repealing the Cape and Natal Acts.32 No mention, however, was made
of the spoor law provisions in the Transkei Penal Code.
When Transkei became an independent homeland in 1976, it began
promulgating its own legislation. The Stock Theft Act of 1977 1
accordingly repealed the equivalent South African Act, but retained
the former 1886 Transkei Penal Code, which thereafter had to be read
in conjunction with the 1977 Act.34 Six years later, Transkei enacted a
new Penal Code.3 5 Provisions of the nineteenth-century Code dealing
with spoor law36 were retained, although with different wording. The
1983 Code provided that:
'151. Any person who fraudulently and with intent to injure another shall
create any false spoor shall be guilty of an offence.
152. Whenever any claim is made against any person or persons in respect
of a spoor traced to any kraal or locality, the magistrate of the district
may upon the request of the owner of the animal or animals stolen,
or of any person authorized by such owner, summarily and without
pleading, but in the presence of the heads of the kraals upon whom
responsibility is sought to be attached -
(a) enquire into the circumstances of the case;
(b) determine -
(i) the value of the animal or animals alleged to have been
stolen;
(ii) the damage which the owner or owners shall have sustained
by such loss; and
(iii) the cost of any search or other endeavour to recover the
missing animal or animals; and
(c) fix liability for the amounts mentioned in paragraph (b) and may
give judgment accordingly in favour of the owner which shall then
have the effect of a civil judgment.'
In 1994, when Transkei was reincorporated into South Africa, the
validity of the homeland laws had to be reconsidered so as to facilitate
the territory's transition to its new status in a unitary state. The Justice
Laws and Rationalisation Act repealed Part 9 of the Penal Code,37 and
hence, by implication, left the remainder of the enactment, including
32 Cattle Removal Act 14 of 1870 (Cape) and Act 1 of 1899 (Natal), respectively.
3 Stock Theft Act 25 of 1977 (Transkei).
34 See, for example, Bangindawo and Others v Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority
and Another; Hlantlalala v Head ofthe Western Tembuland Regional Authority and
Others 1998 (2) SACR 16 (Tk) at 18. While similar to the South African law, the main
thrust of the 1977 Act was to create a permit-based system for transporting stock.
3 Transkeian Penal Code Act 9 of 1983 (Transkei).
36 Transkeian Territories Penal Code 24 of 1886 (Cape) (as amended by s 1 of the
Transkeian Territories Penal Code Amendment Act 41 of 1898 (Cape).
3 Schedule II of Act 18 of 1996.
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the sections on spoor law, intact.38 It follows that these provisions are
still in operation.
Even so, the Penal Code was designed to apply only in Transkei,
an entity that no longer exists. As a result, the Code will probably
not survive constitutional review. In Mblekwa and Feni v Head of the
Western Tembuland RegionalAuthority and Another, a case with direct
bearing on the Penal Code, it was held that legislation restricting the
jurisdiction of the Transkeian Regional Courts to Transkeian citizens
and the borders of the homeland constituted an infringement of
section 9 of the Constitution. In other words, application of the law
constituted unfair discrimination.39
As a result, it could be argued that, although sections 151 and 152
of the 1983 Transkeian Penal Code have survived the promulgation
of new statutes on the subject of stock theft, they are highly unlikely
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Any legislation restricted to the
citizens (or inhabitants) of a territorial entity representing the former
apartheid regime is invalid, because it involves violation of the
requirement of equal treatment, a fundamental principle of the South
African Bill of Rights.
b) Survival of the customary rule
The non-statutory versions of the spoor law pose different problems,
the most basic of which is the extent to which customary law is
recognized in the South African legal system. Throughout Africa,
when the European powers imposed their own systems of law on their
colonies, these became the general laws of the land; the continued
application of indigenous systems of customary law was an exception
to the rule.40 It was then assumed that the terms for recognizing
38 The Code was most recently applied in Ramokolo v S (251/10) [20111 ZASCA 77, a
case dealing with section 156 on extortion. See DS Koyana 'Legal Pluralism in South
Africa: the resilience of Transkei's separate legal status in the field of criminal law'
(2005) 26 Obiter 14-25 at 25 discussing the unreported Transkei Division case of S v
XolaniBhobhotyana 63 of 2004).'The reasonable conclusion was that the legislature
had intended the remainder of Act 9 of 1983 to apply throughout Transkei. Bearing
in mind section 241(2) of the Constitution [108 of 19961 re the continuation of
laws, the Transkei Penal Code Act would remain applicable to the exclusion of the
common law until Parliament itself intervened.' Although the South African Law
Reform Commission tabled a request by the Judge President of the Transkei High
Court to repeal the Act (34th Annual Report (2006-2007) of the South African Law
Reform Commission at 14), no action appears to have been taken.
2000 (2) SACR 596 (TK) at 644.
40 W Menski Comparative Law in a Global Context: the legal systems ofAsia and Africa
(2006) 453.
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customary law were not intended to include criminal matters. 4  The
effect of this assumption led to another: that the colonial systems of
criminal law superseded and extinguished customary-law crimes so
that all subjects of the state, settlers and Africans alike, were subject
to the same regime.42
In South Africa since 1988, however, the legislation governing
the proof and application of customary law suggests a contrary
interpretation. Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act4 3
provides that:
'Any court may take judicial notice of ... indigenous law in so far as such law
can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty .... '
Here, the term 'indigenous law' (which is understood to mean the
same as 'customary law') is defined broadly to mean the 'Black law or
customs as applied by the Black tribes in the Republic or in territories
which formerly formed part of the Republic'.4 4 The generality of this
definition clearly invites inclusion of both civil and criminal laws.
What is more, traditional courts have enjoyed a specific power, since
1955, to apply customary criminal law. By an amendment of that year
to the 1927 Black Administration Act,45 traditional rulers were allowed
to adjudicate both civil and criminal claims (although not the offence
of stock theft).4 While the Black Administration Act was repealed in
2005, with effect from 31 July 2006, these provisions are still in force
until a new act is promulgated for traditional courts.47
Apart from these two enactments, customary law has enjoyed a
much stronger position in South Africa's legal system since the advent
of a constitutional democracy. Section 211(3) of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 made application of customary law
41 Policy in post-colonial Africa has been equally ambiguous. See C Anyangwe 'The
whittling away of African indigenous legal and judicial system' (1998) 30 Zambia
Law Journal 46 at 52-53.
42 TW Bennett Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa, the conflict of
personal laws (1985) 40.
Act 45 of 1988.
44 Section 1(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.
45 Sections 12(1) and 20(1)(a)(i) of Act 38 of 1927.
46 In terms of Schedule 3 of the Black Administration Act
47 Section 1(3) of the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of
Certain Laws Act 28 of 2005. In 2008, the Department of Justice tabled a long-
awaited Traditional Courts Bill (115-2008) which was supposed to re-establish the
position of traditional courts and bring their composition and procedures into line
with the Constitution. The Bill limited criminal jurisdiction to certain offences,
but, this time, stock theft was not excluded. The Bill was withdrawn, however,
and, until such time as a new Act comes into force, the existing courts remain
in operation with their jurisdictional powers intact. In January 2012 a new bill
(B1-2012) appeared, but it is much the same as its predecessor.
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mandatory in all the courts of the land 'when that law is applicable,
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law'.48
As it happens, the customary-law versions of the spoor law - as
opposed to the statutory equivalents - have never been specifically
repealed. Even so, it might be argued that the customary laws were
repealed by the enactment of legislation containing provisions the
same as or contrary to customary law. The most likely candidate would
be the national Stock Theft Act of 1959,49 which regulates most matters
concerned with theft of livestock. However, it makes no mention of
rules similar to the spoor law. When introducing a new, uniform
regulation for the Union of South Africa, it sought to repeal only the
legislation formerly applicable in the four provinces. 50
Finally, an argument might be made that the common law of crimes
extinguished the customary-law counterpart, but, for this argument
to succeed, the spoor law must be classified as a criminal matter.
While the inclusion of the law in a penal code implies that all of its
elements are criminal, we have seen above that most are civil. In fact,
if we take the 1886 Transkei Penal Code as a fairly typical statement of
customary law at the time, it appears that only section 201 reflected an
unambiguously criminal offence: the laying of false spoor.51 Indeed,
the courts' interpretation of the spoor law provides the most telling
evidence in favour of its civil nature.52
Classification of rules as civil or criminal, however, raises an
awkward problem, as yet not considered by the courts: the conflict of
personal laws. Is it the task of common or customary law to determine
whether a rule is civil or criminal? No one has given serious thought
to this question, at least in so far as it concerns the classification of
crimes and delicts. As a matter of practice, it seems most likely that the
courts have simply used the laws with which they are most familiar in
order to classify. Accordingly, traditional courts have used customary
law and the magistrates' courts and High Court the common law.
48 When section 211(3) is read in conjunction with other provisions in the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, notably, s39(2), it can be taken to mean that
customary and Roman-Dutch law are now equal partners as the general laws of the
land. See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras [365]ff.
' Act 57 of 1959.
50 See the Schedule to the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959.
51 Although s 200 1(3) of the Transkei Penal Code - the obligation on neighbours to
assist the pursuers of stolen stock - could also be considered penal, but the courts
interpreted it as civil. Indeed, s 200 1(5), which obliged the head of a homestead to
take up pursuit of missing stock, was matched by a duty to make compensation for
failure to comply.
52 Sigidi vMqezana 2 NAC 94 (1910). See, too, the cases cited in footnote 6 regarding
the evidence necessary to prove breach of the spoor law.
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It must also be appreciated that, from the initial decision to
subject a cause of action to customary or common law, logic compels
application of the same law to any associated issues.53 In consequence,
if a claim is governed by customary law, then those parts of the spoor
law regulating proof are also applicable. Hence, tracing spoor to a
homestead would be sufficient circumstantial proof, on a balance of
probabilities,5 4 of the identity of the thief. There would be no need
to lead further evidence to establish that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt.55
The problems of classification and conflict of laws are compounded
by a third problem: the ambivalence of customary law on matters of
crime and delict. Customary law does not always distinguish between
the two, but, if it chooses to, will not necessarily do so in the same
way as the common law.56 Theft of goods, for instance, is generally
considered delictual, but the theft of livestock may also be criminal.
Shaka, for example, decided to make cattle stealing a special case, so
he decreed that it was an offence punishable by death.
The common law, on the other hand, requires a clear separation of
civil and criminal matters, because this distinction has an important
bearing on the subsequent legal procedure. In the first place, the
classification of wrongdoing as a crime may determine which court will
have jurisdiction to hear the matter. In the second place, the common
law prescribes an elaborate set of rules for criminal prosecutions, all
designed to protect the accused. In the third place, the common law
-ays down a higher standard of proof for crimes than for delicts.
Asindicated above, the spoor law was enacted as a provision in a
penal code, suggesting that all its component parts should be classified
as criminal. The courts, however, treated s 200 of the 1886 Transkei
Code as the basis for a civil claim,59 and this approach was borne out
5 See further TW Bennett Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa (1985)
113.
5 The Queen v M'Balo (1891-1892) 9 SC 379 at 380.
5 Injikislei vRex 1909 23 EDC 289, it was noted that evidence of spoor may be enough
to attract civil liability under section 200, but would not be enough for a criminal
conviction. See also 7yaliti and Others v Sindiwe 1 NAC 158 (1907); Gontsana and
Others v Konzana 1 NAC 213 (1908) and Sigidi v Mqezana 2 NAC 94 (1910).
56 See JMT Labuschagne & JA Van den Heever 'Die oorsprong en onderskeid tussen
fenomene misdaad en delik in primigene regstelsels' (1991) 12 Obiter 80 at 95 and
RB Mqeke 'Customary Law of Delict and the Bill of Rights' (1992) 25 Dejure 462 at
467.
57 NJJ Olivier et al Die Privaatreg van die Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoetaalsprekendes
(1981) 362.
58 Krige op cit (n2) 229.
5 The Queen v M'Balo (1891-1892) 9 SC 379 at 380. See, too, Sigidi v Mqezana 2 NAC
94 (1910); Gontsana and Others v Konzana 1 NAC 213 (1908) and Zwaartbooi v
Gunjwe and Others 3 NAC 267 (1912).
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by the more recent 1983 Transkeian Code. 60 Thus, only section 201 of
the 1886 Code (laying a false spoor) was deemed a criminal offence.
The final provision on the spoor law, section 202, was considered
procedural, because it prescribed the method to be followed for
establishing the civil claim in s 200.
In summary, a careful reading of the customary spoor law - whether
in the official or living versions of that law - will show that the nature
of its component parts as civil or criminal wrongs is far from obvious.
The better interpretation suggests that, with the exception of laying
a false spoor, the various wrongs are civil in nature. It follows that,
apart from this one instance, the question whether customary law has
survived colonial occupation is redundant.
3. The constitutionality of the spoor law
Even if the spoor law is still available to prosecutors and the owners
of missing stock, its validity could nonetheless be challenged as a
violation of the Bill of Rights on two grounds: the effect of imposing
collective liability and reversing the onus of proof.
a) Collective liability
Collective liability means that individuals are held liable for an offence
even if they were not at fault and had not committed any wrongful
act. As an instance of this principle, one -aspect of the spoor law is
a prime example:61 the possibility of the head of a homestead and
his neighbours being held liable to compensate the owner of stolen
stock, simply because the tracks of the stock led to the vicinity of the
homestead.62
On the face of it, the idea that individuals can be held liable for
wrongdoing for which there is no clear proof that they were responsible
seems unjust. Admittedly, the spoor law does not violate any particular
section of the Bill of Rights, but it could be argued that collective
liability is contrary to public policy.
In her analysis of the customary law of wrongs, however, Sally Falk
Moore explains collective liability in terms which suggest that it is
60 Section 152(c) of the Transkei Penal Code Act 9 of 1983 (Transkei), which, it should
be noted, is not cast in the peremptory terms of a crime.
61 Koyana op cit (nl) 57; Krige op cit (n2) 223; Whitfield op cit (n6) 481 and Zwaartbooi
v Gunjwe and Others 3 NAC 267 (1912).
62 Thus the spoor law was said to be 'the distinctive privilege conferred upon the
owner of stolen stock ... quite unknown to the common law and [with] no parallel
except in the collective responsibility under the old feudal law': Zwaartbooi's supra
(n61).
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less threatening to (Western) ideas of justice than might superficially
appear. 6 To understand the customary system of liability, we need
to be aware of the way in which that law deals with property. All
economically significant items, especially those concerned with
production, such as land and livestock, are administered by the most
senior member of a family. Because individuals have no control over
this property, they have no means of satisfying their debts. Creditors
must look to the head of the family for payment. While this situation
might seem to place an unfair burden on one person, it ensures
compensation for the victim of a wrong.65
Similar rules can be found in the common law, in the form of vicarious
liability and a parent's liability for the misdeeds of minor children. In
both instances, persons who committed no wrongful act are obliged
to compensate the complainant. In the case of vicarious liability, for
example, employers are considered best equipped financially to put
right any damage done by their employees. On these grounds, the
doctrine has been held to be compatible with the Bill of Rights.67
Similar reasoning underlies parental liability for the delicts of minor
children, and, as it happens, this form of liability has a close parallel
with the customary-law rule of 'kraalhead' liability.68 The latter is based
on both kinship and co-residence within a homestead,6 9 whereby the
head of a family or homestead is responsible for the wrongs of all
63 See, in this regard, the useful article by SF Moore 'Legal liability and evolutionary
interpretation: some aspects of strict liability, self-help and collective responsibility'
in M Gluckman (ed) The Allocation ofResponsibility (1972) 54ff.
64 MW Prinsloo Die Inheemse Strafreg van die Noord-Sotho (1978) 9; MW Prinsloo
Die Inbeemse Administratiefreg van 'n Noord-Sotbostam (1981) 92 -and Inbeemse
Publiekreg in Lebowa (1983) 177 and AC Myburgh Indigenous Criminal Law in
Bophuthatswana (1980) 56-57.
65 And the head of the family could no doubt exact suitable reparation from the
perpetrator of the offence.
66 And are considered responsible for introducing new sources of risk into society by
engaging in their business ventures: RHJobnson Crane Hire (Pty) Ltd v Grotto Steel
Construction (Pty) Ltd 1992 (3) SA 907 (C) at 908. See, too, JM Potgieter 'Preliminary
thoughts on whether vicarious liability should be extended to the parent-child
relationship' (2011) 32 Obiter 189 at 191.
67 K vMinister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).
68 See K's case supra (n67) at para [241 (fn30). O'Regan J did not take the point further,
but family head liability is a broader concept. See TW Bennett Customary Law in
South Africa (2004) 325-327.
69 In either case, it is assumed that the family head has control over the family estate
and all persons resident within the homestead: Olivier op cit (n57) 418-434; C
Rautenbach, JC Bekker & N Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in Soutb Africa
(2010) 81-82, and see TW Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for
Southern Africa (1991) 329-330, 341-343 and 351-357.
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those under his power.70 The common-law rule is distinguishable in
so far as it requires fault on the part of the parent or an employer-
employee type of relationship before the parent can be held liable for
damage caused by the child.
By placing liability on the person most able to make compensation,
the spoor law is akin to these common-law rules, but it differs in
one critical respect: not only are the persons held liable innocent of
any wrongdoing, but they may also have had no relationship with the
offenders apart from geographic proximity. In particular, the spoor
law differs from the parent-child situation by extending liability far
beyond the realm of immediate kin to include all inhabitants of a
homestead,7 2 and indeed even neighbouring homesteads.73
Vicarious and parent-child liability are concerned with delicts. When
we turn to look at collective liability within the context of criminal
acts, different issues are raised. Here, the international human rights
code voices strong objection to the idea of collective punishment.
This idea, with its connotations of the Nazi law of Sippenbaft,4 is
prohibited under both customary international law 75 and the Rome
70 Peter v Sango and Mrwebi 1972 BAC (S) 185 at 187. See, to Skenjana v Guza 1944 NAC
(C&O) 102 and Mblokonyelwa v Ngoma 1950 NAC (S) 197. Hence, kraalhead liability
arises not only from control of property but also from the disciplinary powers
which the head of a homestead is expected to exercise over his subordinates: TW
Bennett 'The status of children under indigenous law: the age of majority' in AJGM
Sanders Southern Africa in Need of Law Reform (1980) 18 at 19. See, too, RB Mqeke
'Can we find a suitable basis for the kraalhead's delictual liability in respect of the
minor inmates of his kraal in African law' (1981) 98 SALJ 266 at 266 and 270.
71 April v Pretorius 1906 TS 824 and De Beer v Sergeant 1976 (1) SA 246 (T). See, in
general, Potgieter op cit (n66) 193 and JM Potgieter 'Aanspreeklikheid van ouers vir
skade veroorsaak deur hul minderjarige kinders?' (2008) 71 THRHR 331.
72 The reason for this is because litigation is between groups and not individuals: JMT
Labuschagne & JA Van den Heever 'Gedingsaanvang en die aanmeldingsprosedure
in die inheemse deliktereg' in PD De Kock & JMT Labuschagne (eds) FestschriftJ C
Bekker (1995) 95 at 99.
7 Whitfield op cit (n6) 481-482.
7 See, for example, Robert Loeffel Sippenhaft in the Third Reich: analysing the spectre
offamily liability punishment against opposition in Nazi Germany 1933-1945 (2004)
University of New South Wales.
7 Common article 3(b) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims and the 1977 Additional Protocol 11. Moreover, article 33 of Geneva
Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides
that: 'No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation
or of terrorism are prohibited .... ' A similar provision appears in Article 75(2)(d) of
Additional Protocol II Rule 103.
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Statute constituting international criminal law.76 These provisions -
whether treaty or custom - form part of South African law.77
Thus, if application of the spoor law were to result in the imposition
of a criminal penalty on individuals who did not actually commit
stock theft, it could be considered invalid. In this respect, however,
we should compare crimes of participation and the doctrine of
common purpose, both of which are regarded as acceptable means for
attributing criminal liability under the common law. In S v Thebus and
Another,78 although the Constitutional Court carefully scrutinized
common purpose, it held that the doctrine was compatible with the
Bill of Rights.
Common purpose is conceived in terms of the proximity of an
offender (both factually and legally) to the commission of a crime.80 It
denotes an 'active association and participation in a common criminal
design with the requisite blameworthy state of mind'.8 ' Each party
then bears responsibility for conduct falling within the common
design, but committed by only one member of the group.82 Liability
arises in two situations: a prior agreement83 or an active association at
the time the crime is committed. The effect of common purpose is
76 See article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) dealing
with joint liability and common purpose, both of which demand the intentional
wrongdoing of the perpetrator (article 25(d)).
n In terms of section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,
1996, they are deemed part of South African common law if they are custom, and,
in terms of sections 231(4) and (5), treaties may be incorporated into South African
law. See, too, the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Act 27 of 2002.
78 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para [501.
7 The doctrine is derived from English law (JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law
3ed (2005) 575), and entered South African law via section 78 of the Transkei Penal
Code 24 of 1886 (Cape). See, too, S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A) at 14.
so Nzo's case supra (n79) at 16 and Burchell op cit (n79) 576.
81 S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para [19]; S v Ngobozi 1972 (3) SA
476 (A) and S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A) at 705-706.
82 Burchell op cit (n79) 570.
83 In cases where there was no prior agreement, the party held liable in terms of the
common purpose must have been present at the scene of the crime, aware that
it was being committed, intending to be in common cause with the others, and
manifesting a 'shared common purpose' with the perpetrators by associating with
them: S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para [19].
84 S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para [191; Magmoed vJanse van
Rensburg and Others 1993 (1) SA 777 (A) at 810G and Burchell op cit (n79) 55. The
usual elements of a crime must be proved, namely, mens rea (S v Mgedezi 1989 (1)
SA 687 (A) at 705-706) and unlawful conduct (Burchell op cit (n79) 572-573).
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to dispense with the requirement of causation for establishing criminal
liability.85
The spoor law and common purpose have certain points of
similarity. Neither requires proof of a causal relationship between the
offender's conduct and the crime; no prior agreement is necessary,
merely a passive association; and both rules infringe the presumption
of innocence. Even so, the spoor law can be distinguished. Its scope is
even broader than that of common purpose: notwithstanding evidence
of the defendant's refusal to participate in a theft, he can be held
liable. Mere residential association is sufficient. And, more seriously,
the spoor law amounts to a reversal of the onus of proof (for which
see below).86
What is more, the doctrine of common purpose not only treats
participants as co-perpetrators, rather than accomplices,87 but also
requires evidence of a common design, which entails proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that, while one party in the group committed the
unlawful act, other identifiable perpetrators were of the same intent.
In comparison, the spoor law holds the group liable for a possible
crime committed by one of its members: no fault needs to be proved
and no actual offender (or act of theft) needs to be identified.
Participation in a crime is another common-law method for attributing
liability to members of a group. According to this principle, each
participant linked to a crime, whether as perpetrator, co-perpetrator,
accomplice or accessory before and after the fact, may be held liable-
alongside the principal offender.89 In this case, the spoor law presents
significant differences, since the inmates of a homestead need commit
no act at all in becoming associated with the crime. Liability is based
solely on being the inmate of a neighbouring homestead.
In summary, the collective responsibility element of the spoor law
is clearly incompatible with public policy in matters of crime, but in
matters of delict it is probably acceptable. In this event, the customary-
8 Thebus's case supra (n84) at para [34]: 'Provided the accused actively associated
with the conduct of the perpetrators in the group that caused the death and had the
required intention in respect of the unlawful consequence, the accused would be
guilty of the offence.'
86 Which is not the case with the doctrine of common purpose: Thebuss case supra
(n84) at para [43].
87 Burchell op cit (n79) 582
8 Lastly, in the case of common purpose, remote parties can defend themselves by
claiming mistake as regards the sequence of events (Burchell op cit (n79) 156),
whereas, in the case of spoor law, the only defences are a reasonable explanation
or proof that the spoor continues beyond the homestead.
8 In South African common law, where 'more than one person may be involved in
the commission of a crime, the law assigns liability to such persons': Burchell op cit
(n79) 570.
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law conception of spoor law will raise no cause for concern, since the
sanction for the offence is generally compensation, not a penalty.
b) Proof and the reverse onus of proof
According to the common law and s 35(3)(h) of the Bill of Rights,
defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. The prosecution
therefore bears the onus of proving their guilt, which it must do
beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of adducing evidence in
rebuttal (weerleggingslas) may shift to the accused, depending on the
measure of proof of the case,90 but this rebuttal should not amount to
a reverse onus.9 1
The doctrine of common purpose which, as we have seen, has
certain similarities to the spoor law, absolves the prosecution from
its duty to prove all the elements of a crime,92 and so, prima facie,
would seem to be in conflict with the Bill of Rights. In S v Thebus and
Another,9 3 however, the Constitutional Court decided that common
purpose did not amount to a violation of the rights to dignity, freedom
and security, nor did it amount to an infringement of the presumption
of innocence.94 The Court said that by relieving the prosecution of
having to prove a causal link between the conduct and the unlawful
consequence, it assisted in crime control, and thereby operated in the
interests of public policy.9 5 Insistence on the requirement of causality
in common-purpose crimes would hamper the effective prosecution of
collaborative 'criminal enterprises'.96
The spoor law is an obvious case of reversing the onus of proof, and
thereby violating the presumption of innocence, because it provides
that, once tracks are traced to a homestead, the onus then lies on the
head of that establishment to show what happened to the missing
livestock. Objections to the rule, however, apply only to criminal
matters, and, in so far as the spoor law results in civil liability it might
well pass constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the argument for retaining
the rule is strengthened by the same policy grounds underlying the
doctrine of common purpose: it will serve the useful purpose of
alleviating the plaintiff's burden to prove all elements of an endemic
offence in rural areas.
90 PJ Schwikkard & SJ Van der Merwe Principles ofEvidence 3ed (2009) 499-502.
9' Schwikkard & Van der Merwe op cit (n90) 517-521.
92 Burchell op cit (n79) 580.
9 S v Thebus supra (n84).
9 S v Thebus supra (n84) at paras [361 and [431.
9 S v Thebus supra (n84) at para [371.
96 S v Thebus supra (n84) at para [34].
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4. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to determine whether the spoor law
still existed and whether it was constitutionally valid. No absolute
answer can be given to the question, however, principally because the
description of the spoor law as a 'law' gives the misleading impression
that it is a single offence. The 'law' is better described as a collection of
rules, only one of which constitutes a crime: the laying of false spoor.
The others constitute delicts or methods for determining liability.
Although not mentioned for many years in the reported cases, the
spoor law was not formally extinguished by imposition of the colonial
system of criminal law or subsequent legislation on stock theft. In
fact, it still maintains a precarious position in the Transkei Penal
Code,9 7 and it clearly survives in the official version of customary law.
Moreover, in spite of the long silence on the subject, spoor law may
well be a rule of the living customary law. We simply have no research
indicating whether it is still in use.
Whatever its exact formal status, however, the customary-law version
of spoor law stands to be applied by any South African court in terms
of s 211(3) of the Constitution and the Law of Evidence Amendment
Act.
Unlike the spoor law, the practice of stock theft can be in no doubt.
According to a statement put out by the South African Police Service, it
is described as 'a priority crime in most provinces of South Africa'.98
As its previous record indicates, the spoor law was regarded
as an effective deterrent on stock theft, and, because it spread
responsibility for crime control throughout local communities, the law
was enthusiastically embraced by the colonial authorities. On these
grounds, it would seem as if the spoor law still has a useful role to
play, especially when it is borne in mind that groups rather than by
individuals could be responsible for the evil it was designed to combat.
As a SAPS bulletin from KwaZulu-Natal indicates, stock theft is now
the subject of organised crime.
'There appears to be a chain of stock theft perpetrators that begins with
members of the community from where the livestock is stolen, and ends
with persons who assist with the final sale of stolen stock and the purchasers
themselves. Stock traders and speculators are rife in the province and operate
in a largely unregulated manner. Some speculators are believed to have
'runners' who regularly steal for them. Local criminals provide the critical
9 Although, in so far as the Transkei and the notion of Transkeian citizenship have
been abolished, the law will be open to constitutional review.
98 South African Policy Service 'Stock Theft' (22 June 2008), available at http.//www.
agriwiki.co.za/index.php?title=Stock tbeft, accessed on 21 March 2012.
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link that enables organised individuals and groups to enter into a location
and steal livestock.'99
In collaborative crimes of this nature, when it is difficult to prove
participation, the Constitutional Court was willing to uphold a method
of crime control similar to spoor law, the common-law doctrine of
common purpose.10 0
Notwithstanding the social value of spoor law, however, can all
aspects of it be supported in today's constitutional democracy? One
is clearly unobjectionable: the criminal offence of laying false spoor.
Others may prove to be more problematic: the presumption of liability
based on the existence of spoor in a neighbourhood; the consequent
duty to assist in the search for missing stock; the imposition of liability
to compensate the stock owner if assistance or explanation is not
forthcoming and, perhaps most important, implicit right of self-help.
South African authorities have an understandably ambivalent
attitude towards the principle of self-help. While it can all too easily
degenerate into vigilantism,10 a criticism that was levelled at the
colonial application of spoor law,10 2 the prevalence of stock theft is
such that Police Services are encouraging communities to play a more
active part in combating stock theft.
'Amakhosi [in KwaZulu-Natal] need to be trained in a number of areas,
including in relation to the keeping of records of stock theft cases reported
to them, stock marking and stock theft prevention techniques. They must
also take action against stock owners who allow their livestock to wander
unattended and must encourage communities to erect and maintain adequate
fencing."03
Indeed, collaboration between rural communities and law enforcement
authorities has been a live issue since colonial times. 0 4
9 KwaZulu-Natal Department of Community Safety & Liaison 'Stock Theft in Kwazulu-
Natal' (2008) KZN DCSL 16, available at http.//www.kzncomsafety.gov.za/Portals/O/
Documents/Research/STOCK%2THEFT%201%20PDF.pdf accessed on 21 March
2012.
100 S v Thebus supra (n84) at para [401: 'misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of
society and the-rights of victims than crimes perpetrated by individuals'. See, to S v
Safatsa and Otbers 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) at 900 and Burchell op cit (n79) 579.
101 M Shaw 'South Africa: Crime in transition' (1996) 9 Terrorism and Political Violence
156-175.
102 Mostert op cit (n20) 450; Davenport & Saunders op cit (n21) 134.
103 KwaZulu-Natal Department of Community Safety & Liaison op cit (n99) 23.
104 Hence such provisions as Section 9 of the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959 provides
that: 'whenever any owner, lessee or occupier of land, reasonably suspects that any
person has ... any livestock ... in regard to which an offence has been committed,
search without warrant .... If he thereupon finds that any livestock ... in regard to
which he reasonably suspects an offence to have been committed, he may arrest
without warrant such person ... and shall as soon as possible convey such person
and the livestock ... so found ... to a police station.'
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Arguably, the spoor law can find a useful place in this cooperative
enterprise. The presumption that tracks leading to a homestead indicate
the person responsible for the theft of stock considerably eases the
burden of proving the offence. Because no criminal liability ensues,
there can be no constitutional objection to this aspect of the spoor law.
The duty to assist and the consequent imposition of liability to do so,
however, requires further scrutiny. No fault liability of this nature is
accepted in South African law - as, for instance, in cases of vicarious
and parental liability - but it is an exception to the rule, and must be
supported by sound social and economic principles.105
The spoor law goes further in spreading the net of liability: the
defendant commits no wrongful act - apart from a failure to assist in a
search - and has no relationship at all with the actual offender. In fact,
as understood in terms of s 200 of the Transkeian Penal Code, the rule
may render the heads of all homesteads in the vicinity to which the
spoor was traced liable to pay damages.10 6
In the past, of course, the notion of collective liability made sense,
because the heads of homesteads, by drawing on the resources of
all those living under their control, were the persons best able to
make reparation for wrongdoing. But it may well be asked whether the
spoor law is appropriate in today's society. The answer would depend
on whether we are considering urban or rural conditions. While the
former is a loose aggregation of individuals, relationships in rural
communities are still relatively close knit.
It is in this regard that the spoor law displays its principal value:
the emphasis of civic responsibility for the doings of neighbours.
When people are encountered passing through a district with cattle,
they must be questioned, otherwise the local inhabitants may be held
liable for stock losses. Such thinking is consonant with ubuntu,107 a
doctrine that the courts have taken from the Postamble to the Interim
Constitution 0 8 and launched into the mainstream of South African
105 In the law of delict, for instance, an individual will not be held liable for a failure
to prevent damage in the absence of a clear legal duty to act, such as situations
arising from control of a dangerous object or serving.in a specific ocupation. See
the dictum of the court in Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 (3) SA 1049
(SCA) at 1054: 'Society is hesitant to impose liability in law for, as it is sometimes
put "minding one's own business".'
1o6 Olivier et al op cit (n57) 49 submit that it is incorrect to refer to the liability of the
family head, because there is no separate and independent liability: the correct
description would be the co-liability (in solidum and s~parate) of the family head
with others involved.
107 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras [224] and [308] and See CJ
Roederer 'The constitutionally inspired approach to vicarious liability in cases of
intentional wrongful acts by the police: one small step in restoring the public's trust
in the South African police services' (2005) 21 SAJHR 575 at 593.
'os Act 200 of 1993.
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law. Ubuntu requires people to take an interest in the problems of
their neighbours and share in their responsibilities.10 9
Moreover, with improved methods of crime detection, the value of
the presumption built into the spoor law in identifying stock thieves
is questionable.
109 See A Shutte Ubuntu: an etbic for a new Soutb Africa (2001) 52-53.
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